Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1977

Leroy Schultz v. Jose Quintana : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Phil L. Hansen and Associates; Attorneys for DefendentAppellantfStephen M. Harmsen; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Schultz v. Quintana, No. 15134 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/598

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEROY SCHULTZ,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

No. 15134

JOSE QUINT ANA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge

PHIL L. HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
STEPHEN M. HARMSEN
350 South 400 East, #G -1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE NA1URE OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

•. •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

..... ........................

1

.................................

2

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE
STANDARD OF CARE A PROPERTY
OWNER OWES TO PERSONS INJURED
ON HIS PROPERTY
. . . . . •. . . . . . . . . . . . . ••. . . •

5

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT WAS ERROR

9

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATEMENT OF POINTS
ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

POINT III

CONCLUSION

THE DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT OF
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY BY INTERJECTING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
OR NOT DEFENDANT HAD HOMEOWNER' S INSURANCE SO PREJUDICED
THE JURY THAT IN THE INTERESTS
OF FAIR NESS AND JUSTICE, THE
JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF SHOULD
BE REVERSED OR REMANDED FOR
NEW TRIAL .....................•....•..•..

11

...........................................

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-i-

AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

Martin v. Jones, 122 Utah 597, 253 P.2d 359 (1953)

7,8,9,10

Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P .2d 121
(1965) • • . • . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .

10

Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 168,
478P.2d496(1970) ...........•.••..••......•...•..•

6

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416,
260P.2d741(1953) .................................

12

TEXTS

62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability

§

55, at 297 -9

6, 7
7,8

JIFU, Inst. Nos. 45 .3, 45 .10

RULES

Utah R • Civ. P. 59

12

Utah R. Civ. P. 60

12,13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TI-IE STATE OF UTAH

LEROY SCHULTZ,
Plaintiff- Respondent,
-v-

JOSE QUINTANA,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 15134

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in which plaintiff seeks to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained on defendant's property due to the negligence of the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried before an eight-person jury in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lak:e County, State of Utah, with
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. presiding. From a judgment for
the plaintiff, defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant asks that the judgment against him be set aside
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and that the verdict be reversed in his favor as a matter of law, or in
the alternative defendant asks for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Jose Quintana, was defendant in a personal injury
suit tried in the Third Judicial District Court on March 16 and 17, 1977.
Plaintiff, Leroy Schultz, alleged that appellant was negligent in the
placement of certain survey stakes on defendant's property, over one of
which plaintiff claimed that he tripped, sustaining injuries which allegedly
disabled him for 88 days. Plaintiff sought to recover special damages for
medical treatment and lost wages as a railroad switchman in the amount
of $6, 739 .19. Plaintiff also claimed general damages for pain and suffering in the amount of $40, 000. 00.
The survey stake, over which plaintiff claimed that he
stumbled, was allegedly driven on or near the property line of defen dant' s property at 2422 Lake Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The rear of
appellant's property abutted land owned by the Utah State Road Commission on the date of the alleged injury, August 25, 1974. Appellant had
received notice of his successful bid on the property August 21, 1974,
having bid $188. 89 more than the unsuccessful bidder, his next door
neighbor and the plaintiff Schultz. Plaintiff had a prescriptive easement
in a coarsely graveled north-south right-of-way abutting defendant's
property, by which right-of-way he gained access

to

parking and a
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garage at the rear of his property at 2420 Lake Street. Appellant
responded in an interrogatory that he drove the survey stakes on or
about August 24, 1974, in such a line as to identify and preserve his
neighbor's right-of-way which he believed

to

be between the west

boundaries of the Lake Street lots and the east boundary of the property
he acquired from the state. The stakes were installed to delineate the
property line on which a fence was to be built later between defendant's
property and plain tiff's right-of -way.
On the night of the alleged injury, plaintiff had backed his
car south over the gravel driveway turning west onto a second east-west
paved public right-of-way that would lead him to Lake Street and thence
to work. Plaintiff stopped his car on the paved right-of-way and in the
dark rushed across defendant's property to his residence to get his
lantern. In his haste and in the dark, hurrying over the loosely
graveled right-of-way, plaintiff stumbled and fell. Plaintiff brought
this action to recover damages sustained in that fall. The jury on
special verdict found the defendant-appellant 75 percent negligent and
awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $3, 342.26 plus costs.
Plaintiff's attorney introduced the case to the jury with the
following opening remarks:
MR. HARMSEN:
• . . Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, the Judge has
explained to you the nature of this
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case and I am sure that many of you
having owned homes or been involved
in having friends who have been in valved in lawsuits or just generally
being aware of the problem of owning
a home, the problems of life in gen era!, may be [sic] have some what
[sic] of a prejudice against personal
injury cases, at least the idea that
there is a lot of people running
around that every time they get into
an accident all of a sudden there [sic]
neck starts to hurt and all of a sudden
there [sic] back starts to feel sore
and then they think that may be [sic J
the excuse to go to the insurance
company and get a large settlement-(Reporter' s transcript on appeal,
page 3.)
The Court admonished plaintiff's attorney and said:
The jury will disregard everything
Mr. Harmsen had to say up to this
point. You may start again, Mr.
Harmsen.
At the noon recess, the following conversation took place
between the Court and Mr. Fratto, defendant's attorney of record at
trial:
THE COURT:
I was going to ask,
did you have anything else on the
opening statement you wanted to
make in the record?
MR. FRATTO:
few words.
THE COURT:
Harmsen' s?

Yes, I will say a
Yes, but on Mr.
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MR. FRATTO:
I didn't get it.

What was that?

THE COURT:
Did you have any
motions to malce concerning it?
MR. FRATTO:

No.

THE COURT: All right, you have
waived them then. I would have
granted a mistrial if you had asked
for it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE STANDARD
OF CARE A PROPERTY OWNER OWES TO
PERSONS INJURED ON HIS PROPERTY.
Over appellant's objection (Reporter's transcript of trial,
page 191), the Court gave the following instruction to the jury:
The rights of a person to use and
enjoy his property is qualified by a
duty to exercise reasonable care for
the safety of others who may pass
by his property.
The duty of an owner of property
adjacent to a right of way extends
not only to the user of the right of
way but also those who reasonably
stray a short distance from the
right of way for a casual purpose,
(Emphasis added.)
The owner of land abutting the right
of way may be negligent creating an
unsafe condition thereon.
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An unsafe condition as that term is
used in these instructions, means
a condition on the land in question
involving an unreasonable risk of
injury to persons properly using
such area.
While the instruction given may be proper in some cases,
it was clearly improper under the facts of this case. The duty of care
which a property owner owes to others who are injured on his premises
is determined by classifying the injured party as either an invitee,
licensee, or trespasser. This court defined the classes of persons in
Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P .2d 496 (1970). The
court defined an invitee as a person who goes onto the premises of
another at the invitation of the owner, a licensee is one who goes on the
land of another without invitation but with the landowner's permission,
and a trespasser is one who goes on the land of another without the permission or invitation of the landowner.
Under the facts of this case, even read in the light most
consistent with the jury's verdict, the plaintiff could not 'lualify as an
invitee or licensee, as the defendant neither invited nor gave permission
to the plaintiff to enter his premises. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not
introduce any evidence to show that he was on the defendant's premises
at the invitation or with the permission of the defendant. Therefore,
when the plaintiff tripped over the surveyor's stake on defendant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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property, he was a trespasser, for the burden of proof to prove a
higher standard of care rested on the plaintiff, which burden he failed
to meet by failing to introduce any evidence of the facts necessary to

charge defendant with the higher standard of care.
The fact that a person's entrance onto another's property
was innocent or the encroachment was very slight is not sufficient to
render a trespasser an invitee or licensee, nor does the motive, state
of mind, or reasonableness of the actor alter a property owner's liability. 62 Am. ]ur. 2d Premises Liability § 55, at 297-9,
The general rule governing the duty of an owner is that the
observance of due care by an owner toward a trespasser requires no
affirmative conduct to render the premises safe for his use, but only
that the possessor must refrain from injuring the trespasser unnecessarily by willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Martin v. Jones, 122
Utah 597, 253 P .2d 359 (1953). The holding of Martin, supra, was
succinctly restated by the Utah State Bar in the form of two jury instructions in JIFU, Instruction Nos. 45. 3 and 45 .10, which state:
45 .3 Duty of Owner of Land Toward
Trespasser. A trespasser cannot
recover for failure of the possessor
of land to do acts to facilitate the
trespass or to render it safe; nor can
he recover for failure of the possessor
to exercise care in his management of
the premises or in maintenance of
conditions or his activities thereon.
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45 .10 Liability of Owner for Artificial
Conditions on Land. [If you believe
from a preponderance of the evidence
that] plaintiff was a trespasser as that
term is herein defined, he would be
entitled to recover from defendant only
if you find from preponderance of the
evidence the following:
(a) that plaintiff's injury, if any, was
proximately caused by an artificially created condition on the
premises, and
(b) the condition was such that it
involved a risk of serious bodily
harm to persons coming in con tact therewith, and
(c)

the defendant knew or from facts
within his knowledge, should have
known of the presence of tres passers in dangerous proximity
to the condition referred to, and

(d) the condition was such nature that
in the exercise of reasonable care
the defendant should have anticipated that trespassers would not
discover it or realize the risk
involved therein, and
(e) the defendant failed to use reason able care to warn of the said
dangerous condition.
The comparison of the instruction which the trial court
judge gave over defendant's objection to the state of the law in Utah
clearly demonstrates that the given instruction was erroneous. Paragraph 2 of the given instruction reads:
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The duty of an owner of property
adjacent to a right of way extends
not only to the user of the right of
way but also those who reasonably
stray a short distance from the
right of way for a casual purpose.
(Emphasis added.)
In effect, the instruction imposes upon a landowner a duty to a tres -

passer far in excess of what is required under Martin v. Jones, supra.
Furthermore, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the different classes of persons who enter another's premises and the respective
duties owned to each class constituted plain error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT WAS ERROR.
There can be no doubt that the burden of proving each and
every element of negligence was upon the plaintiff, including the burden
of establishing a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff. It was
plaintiff's burden to show under what class of individuals (invitee,
licensee, or trespasser) he claimed a duty owed. Since at the close of
plaintiff's case he had introduced no evidence that he was on defendant's
property at the invitation of the defendant (invitee) or with the permission of the defendant (licensee), the only question which remained under
defendant's motion for directed verdict was whether plaintiff could
recover as a trespasser

0

As previously stated, Martin v. Jones,
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~up~,

requires the following in order for a trespasser to recover for injuries
sustained on the property of another:
(1) the plaintiff's injuries, if any,
must be proximately caused by
an artificially created condition
on the premises, and
(2) the condition was such that it
involved the risk of serious
b'Xlily harm to persons coming
in contact therewith, and
(3) the defendant knew or from
facts within his knowledge should
have known of the presence of
trespassers in dangerous pro xi mity to the condition referred
to, and
(4) the condition was of such narure
that in the exercise of reasonable
care the defend;:mt should have
anticipated that trespassers
would not discover or realize
the risk involved therein, and
(5) the defendant failed to use
reasonable care to warn of the
said dangerous condition.
While arguably the plaintiff could satisfy some of the
requirements of Martin, it was clear as a matter of law that driving
12-inch surveyor's stakes into the ground did not involve a risk of
serious bodily harm to others, nor was the condition of such narure
that he would anticipate that strangers would not discover it or realize
the risk involved therein. And finally as a matter of law, the trial
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court should have ruled that placing 12-inch surveyor's stakes on
defendant's own property line was not unreasonable and that if a duty
were owed the defendant did not breach that duty.
POINT III
THE DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY BY INTERJECTING THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT
HAD HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE SO PREJUDICED THE JURY THAT IN THE INTERESTS
OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, THE JUDGMENT
FOR PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REVERSED OR
REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
Appellant recognizes the mere mention of insurance does
not in all cases lead to the conclusion that the jury was prejudiced or
likely to be to such an extent that .a fair trial could not be had. Robinson
v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965). However, in the
instant case there can be no doubt that the interjection of insurance by
plaintiff's attorney into the trial was deliberate and calculated as the
plaintiff's attorney knew that the defendant did not in fact have any insurance on the property nor was insurance available to pay off any recovery
by the defendant. (Answer to interrogatories, dated the 9th day of June,
1975, answer to question number 4.) Furthermore, the trial court made
it clear that if defendant's attorney had have asked for a mistrial, a
mistrial would have been granted. (Transcript of trial, page 34 .)
It is therefore clear that the interjection of insurance
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coverage as an issue in the trial by plaintiff's attorney is sufficient to
require a mistrial if the defendant's request for a new trial has not been
waived or otherwise lost.
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
(b)

Time for Motion. Motion for a
new trial shall be served not
later than ten days after the
entry of the judgment.

At the noon recess on the first day, the judge informed the
defendant that he had waived any motion for a mistrial or a new trial by
failing to then ask for it. Such a ruling was clearly in contradiction of
Rule 59. It is defendant's position that the trial court judge cannot by
virtue of his own declaration reduce the allowed time for a motion for
a new trial from the ten days allowed under Rule 59 and require such a
motion be made during trial. By virtue of the trial court's ruling, the
defendant has been deprived of his right to petition for a new trial under
Rule 59, and therefore this court should correct the error by granting a
new trial.
Even if defendant's former counsel waived any legal objections to the introduction of the prejudicial statement, the judgment
against defendant should be set aside under Rule 60. Rule 60 provides
that a court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence,
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surprise, or excusable neglect. In the instant case, defendant's
former counsel inadvertently failed to raise his objection to the intro duction of the evidence by plaintiff's counsel during trial. Rule 60
further provides that the procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be either by motion or, as in the instant case, by an
independent action. Since the trial court has already expressed its
views as to the fact that defendant's counsel had waived any objection to
the prejudicial statements, it is now proper in the interests of fairness
and justice to relieve the defendant from the judgment on appeal.
Prejudicial misconduct of plaintiff's attorney affected the
substantial right of appellant to a fair trial. The judgment and verdict
of the jury appear inconsistent with substantial justice. The allowance
of vacation of judgment is a creature of equity designed to relieve
against harshness of enforcing the judgment which may occur through
procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes
which prevent the presentation of a claim or a defense. Warren v. DiXOI_!
Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P .2d 741 (1953). The instant case is a
clear example of where equity will prevent the plaintiff from benefiting
from the deliberate misconduct of his counsel and will at the same time
afford to a defendant a fair and equitable trial.
CONCLUSION
The judgment against the defendant should, as a matter of
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law, be reversed or in the alternative remanded for a new trial. From
the facts presented at trial, it is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain
its burden of proof as to the duty of care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff. Furthermore, the trial court improperly instructed the jury
on the duty owed to a trespasser by the owner or occupier of land.
Finally, in the interests of equity, the judgment should be reversed or
remanded due to the deliberate prejudicial misconduct of plaintiff's
attorney.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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